Washington Law Review
Volume 88

Number 3

10-1-2013

"Carving at the Joints": Using Issue Classes to Reframe Consumer
Class Actions
Jenna C. Smith

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Jenna C. Smith, Comment, "Carving at the Joints": Using Issue Classes to Reframe Consumer Class
Actions, 88 Wash. L. Rev. 1187 (2013).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol88/iss3/10

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

14 - Smith Comment.docx (Do Not Delete)

10/10/2013 5:27 PM

“CARVING AT THE JOINTS”: USING ISSUE CLASSES
TO REFRAME CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS
Jenna C. Smith
Abstract: Achieving class certification in consumer litigation is a highly controversial
and greatly debated area of civil procedure. Historically, certification under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) has been difficult to achieve due to the tension between the
presence of individual issues and Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance, superiority, and
management considerations. The future of certification for Rule 23(b)(3) classes was further
put in question with the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Wal-Mart v.
Dukes in 2011, which enhanced the level of scrutiny courts apply at the Rule 23(a) level of
analysis. The Court’s 2013 decisions in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend and Amgen v. Connecticut
Retirement Plan and Trust Fund further highlight the difficulties Rule 23(b)(3) classes face
in achieving certification. Despite these developments, there are signs of continued vitality.
In 2012, the Seventh Circuit allowed issue class certification in a large employment
discrimination class, notwithstanding the presence of individual issues in McReynolds v.
Merrill Lynch. McReynolds placed Rule 23(c)(4) (a historically seldom used subsection of
Rule 23) in the spotlight as a means of allowing consumer claims to achieve certification in
the post-Dukes era. This Comment explores the use of issue class certification under Rule
23(c)(4) and attempts to clarify when issue class certification is appropriate, with a particular
focus on consumer class actions. By breaking complex issues into smaller, more manageable
pieces, Rule 23(c)(4) allows litigants to frame common issues for class treatment and avoid
an unnecessarily rigorous analysis of the merits of a claim at the certification stage.

INTRODUCTION
The efficacy of using class actions to pursue mass consumer claims is
the subject of much controversy and great uncertainty. 1 Courts are
frequently reluctant to certify mass consumer classes because of the
tension between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and the prevalence
of individual issues. 2 The future of mass-consumer class actions was
further called into question in the landmark decision, Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Dukes, 3 in which the United States Supreme Court set forth a

1. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the
Intersection between Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 71 (noting
that the class action has become the focal point of much political and legal debate); see also John
Romberg, Half a Loaf is Predominant and Superior to None: Class Certification of Particular
Issues Under Rule 23(c)(4)(A), 2002 UTAH L. REV. 249 (discussing generally the difficulty
consumer class actions face at the certification stage).
2. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 594 (1997).
3. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
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more stringent test for satisfying Rule 23(a)’s commonality
requirement. 4 As one commentator noted, Dukes “raises more questions
than it answers.” 5
In light of the heightened standard for achieving certification postDukes, the use of issue classes under Rule 23(c)(4) is an increasingly
attractive option for litigants. 6 Rule 23(c)(4) allows a court to divide
litigation into smaller pieces, a process often referred to as bifurcation. 7
Most commonly, courts employ bifurcation first to decide the issue of
liability, followed by determinations of individual damages in follow-on
proceedings. 8 While bifurcation of a case between liability and damages
is the most common use of Rule 23(c)(4) and the focus of most legal
scholarship on the issue, “there is no rule that if a trial is bifurcated, it
must be bifurcated between liability and damages.” 9 Increasingly, the
debate among courts has shifted to the use of Rule 23(c)(4) to isolate a
threshold issue for class treatment—even if class members’ suits might
ultimately need to be adjudicated individually—as long as the resolution
of the class issue will substantially advance the disposition of the
litigation as a whole. 10
The reinvigoration of Rule 23(c)(4) is in tension not only with
traditional perceptions of Rule 23 classes but also with specific
provisions of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b). This textual tension, combined
with the relative paucity of case law interpreting Rule 23(c)(4), has
resulted in a three-way circuit split. 11 The majority of circuits, including
the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth, interpret Rule 23(c)(4)
expansively, and will certify an issue class even if the claim as a whole
4. Id. at 2551.
5. James Comodeca & Gabrielle Hils, CAFA, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, And Other Key Developments
In Class Action Litigation, ASPATORE, Nov. 2011, at *1, *10, available at 2011 WL 5617994.
6. Jennifer Brooks-Crozier, Put Up Your Dukes: The Fight Over Commonality in the Era of WalMart v. Dukes, 19 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 711, 731 (2013) (discussing the rise of hybrid class
actions post-Dukes).
7. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4); Romberg, supra note 1, at 262–63.
8. 2 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 8:2 (9th ed. 2012); see also
RICHARD NAGAREDA, THE LAW OF CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER AGGREGATE LITIGATION 251
(2009); see also, e.g., Hill v. W. Elec. Co., 672 F.2d 381, 387 (4th Cir. 1982) (“[B]ifurcation of
Title VII class action proceedings for hearings on liability and damages is now commonplace.”).
9. Hydrite Chem. Co. v. Calumet Lubricants Co., 47 F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir. 1995).
10. 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1790, at 588–
90 (3d ed. 2005).
11. See, e.g., Hohider v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 574 F.3d 169, 200 n.25 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The
interaction between the requirements for class certification under Rule 23(a) and (b) and the
authorization of issue classes under Rule 23(c)(4) is a difficult matter that has generated divergent
interpretations among the courts.”).
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does not satisfy Rule 23. 12 The Fifth Circuit rejects this construction of
Rule 23(c)(4) and instead maintains that courts may certify an issue class
only if the claim as a whole merits class-wide treatment. 13 The Third
Circuit follows a slightly different approach, and applies a multi-factor
balancing test to determine whether Rule 23(c)(4) issue classes should
be certified. 14
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 15 is perhaps the most high-profile case to
endorse a liberal use of Rule 23(c)(4) post-Dukes. 16 In McReynolds, 700
African-American employees sued Merrill Lynch, alleging that two
specific company policies had a disparate impact on racial minorities. 17
While the individual nature of damage determinations would likely have
prevented the class from satisfying Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance
requirement, the Seventh Circuit approved the use of Rule 23(c)(4) to
certify the class under Rule 23(b)(2) only on the issue of liability. 18
Writing for the court, Judge Posner found that the greatest efficiency and
fairness would be achieved by “carving at the joints” of the parties’
dispute and resolving the issue of liability on a class-wide basis. 19 While
some courts and commentators view McReynolds as a direct
contradiction of Dukes, 20 others view it as a straightforward application
12. See In re Nassau Cnty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 227 (2d Cir. 2006) (“courts may use
subsection (c)(4) to single out issues for class treatment” even when the cause of action as a whole
could not be certified under Rule 23(b)(3)); see also Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d
1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996) (denying certification of class in Dalkon Shield IUD Products Liability
Litigation based on failure to satisfy Rule 23(a)’s typicality and adequacy requirements, but
clarifying that there was no absolute bar for issue certification in products liability cases).
13. In the Fifth Circuit, “a cause of action, as a whole, must satisfy the predominance requirement
of (b)(3)”; plaintiffs “cannot manufacture predominance through the nimble use of subdivision
(c)(4).” Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996).
14. See Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255, 273 (3d Cir. 2011) (adopting the American
Law Institute’s factors to determine when issue class certification is warranted).
15. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2012),
cert. denied, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 338 (2012).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 488. Initially, the district court denied certification. Id. at 484. However, in light of the
groundbreaking nature of Dukes, the Seventh Circuit surprisingly allowed interlocutory appeal from
the district court’s order denying employee’s amended motion. Id. at 488.
18. Id. at 492.
19. Id. at 491 (quoting Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Systems Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 911 (7th Cir. 2003)).
20. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 14–21, McReynolds, 133 S. Ct. 338 (No. 12-113), 2012 WL
3041173, at *14–21; see also Bolden v. Walsh Const. Co., 688 F.3d 893, 897–98 (7th Cir. 2012). In
Bolden, the court held that district court misinterpreted the McReynolds court’s discussion of Dukes:
Our opinion remarked that the class in Wal-Mart would not have been manageable, but we did
not suggest that this was the basis of the Court’s decision; we just observed that the class
certified there had problems in addition to Rule 23(a)(2), and that company-wide suits that do
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of Rule 23(c)(4) 21 and a practical model for future consumer class
actions to follow. 22 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in McReynolds,
thereby leaving the boundaries of Rule 23(c)(4) unsettled. 23
In light of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, Rule 23(c)(4) is
increasingly relevant as a way to avoid a more searching inquiry into the
merits of a case at the certification stage. 24 In Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut
Retirement Plans & Trust Funds 25 the Court suggested that it would not
continue to endorse a more exacting inquiry into the merits of a case
beyond what the text of Rule 23 requires. 26 However, just a month later,
in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 27 the Court relied heavily on Dukes in
determining that plaintiffs must show that damages are capable of
measurement on a class-wide basis in order to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s
predominance requirement. 28 Consequently, it is unclear whether Dukes
should be viewed as the high-water mark of hostility toward class
certification, or whether the Court will continue to ratchet up class
certification requirements.
Despite recent hostility toward certification of large consumer classes,
for many types of consumer cases, the class action is the only
appropriate mechanism for relief. 29 Especially where consumers have
incurred relatively minor harm or damages, filing individual litigation is
neither economically feasible nor an efficient use of judicial resources.30
present common issues therefore may be certified (if they are manageable, as Wal-Mart would
not have been.).
Id.
21. See, e.g., DL v. District of Columbia, 713 F.3d 120, 127 (2013) (“The putative class in
McReynolds was appropriate post-Wal-Mart because the economic harm alleged by each class
member was the result of the same corporate-wide policies and if the policies were held unlawful
then a question central to the validity of each class member’s claim would be resolved in one
stroke.”).
22. While McReynolds involved employment discrimination claims and class certification under
Rule 23(b)(2), this Comment argues that this approach is one of the best paths toward certification
for consumer litigation, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s 2013 class action decisions.
23. See McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir.
2012), cert. denied, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 338 (2012).
24. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, __U.S__, 133 S. Ct. 1436, 1436–37 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (discussing generally the proposition that Rule 23(c)(4) is increasingly relevant in the
wake of heightened certification requirements).
25. __U.S __, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013).
26. Id. at 1202.
27. Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1426.
28. Id. at 1433–34.
29. William Schwarzer, Structuring Multiclaim Litigation: Should Rule 23 Be Revised?, 94
MICH. L. REV. 1250, 1253 (1996).
30. Romberg, supra note 1, at 258.
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Additionally, class actions promote several important public policies. By
aggregating claims into a single lawsuit, class actions avoid duplicative
litigation and prevent inconsistent results—thereby promoting judicial
economy and maximizing efficiency. 31 Class actions provide social
utility by allowing an aggregation of private individuals to enforce laws,
where the cost of litigation and relatively minor amount of recovery
might prevent the claims from moving forward on an individual basis.32
Additionally, if a class action is successful at the certification stage, the
threat of bearing the cost of the harm causes many defendants to settle
immediately, which can have powerful deterrent effects. 33
This Comment explores the viability of issue class certification under
Rule 23(c)(4) as a means of achieving certification in consumer
litigation. Part I of this Comment explains the requirements for
achieving certification under Rule 23. Part II highlights the importance
of achieving a uniform interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4) in the wake of
expanded federal jurisdiction over class actions. Part III discusses how
recent Supreme Court decisions will impact the way courts interpret
Rule 23. Part IV discusses the viability of issue class certification in the
wake of Dukes, with a particular focus on the Seventh Circuit’s decision
in McReynolds. Part V argues that other circuits should adopt the
expansive interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4) that is in favor in the majority
of federal circuits. Part VI discusses the limitations of issue class
certification and provides guidance as to when issue class certification
might not be appropriate.
I.

TO ACHIEVE CERTIFICATION, A PUTATIVE CLASS MUST
SATISFY RULE 23(A)’S FOUR PREREQUISITES, AS WELL
AS ONE SUBCATEGORY OF RULE 23(B)

The class action mechanism is an important procedural device that
allows courts to resolve common claims impacting many individuals in a
single action. 34 Rule 23 establishes the requirements for certification of a
federal class action. 35 In order to achieve certification, which is required
before class-action litigation can commence, a class must first meet the

31. Rachel Tallon Pickens, Too Many Riches? Dukes v. Wal-Mart and the Efficacy of Monolithic
Class Actions, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 71, 73 (2006).
32. Id. at 73–74; see also Redish, supra note 1, at 87 (noting that “private class actions for money
damages can yield significant social benefits”).
33. Pickens, supra note 31, at 74.
34. GEOFFREY HAZARD, JR. ET AL., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE § 833 (10th ed. 2011).
35. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
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four requirements of Rule 23(a) and must also meet the separate (though
overlapping) requirement for any one of Rule 23(b)’s subsections.36 The
four Rule 23(a) prerequisites are numerosity, 37 commonality, 38
typicality, 39 and adequacy of representation. 40 Prior to Dukes, most
courts interpreted Rule 23(a)’s prerequisites liberally. 41 The rationale
behind this approach was that the merits of a potential class are more
accurately discerned at the Rule 23(b) level of analysis. 42 As the next
section of this Comment will discuss, Dukes shifted the heart of classcertification analysis to Rule 23(a), by ratcheting up the commonality
requirement to require a more searching analysis of the uniformity of the
legal or factual issues of the class. 43
In addition to meeting the requirements of Rule 23(a), a class must
also satisfy the requirements of one of Rule 23(b)’s subsections to

36. Id. 23(a); Id. 23(b).
37. To satisfy numerosity, the class must be “so numerous that joinder of all of the members is
impracticable.” Id. 23(a)(1); accord Brady v. Thurston Motor Lines, 726 F.2d 136, 145 (4th Cir.
1984). There is no minimum number of class members required, nor is a strict mathematical test
required to satisfy numerosity. Brady, 726 F.2d at 145. Numerosity depends on the facts and
circumstances of each case. Arnold v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 439, 448
(N.D. Cal. 1994).
38. Commonality requires “questions of law or fact common to the class.” FED. R. CIV. P.
23(a)(2). Prior to Dukes, the commonality requirement had not been applied rigorously, and was
“not demanding.” See Comodeca & Hils, supra note 5, at *3 (Prior to Dukes, “[m]ost practitioners
defending class actions spent little time challenging the ‘commonality’ requirement under Rule
23(a), instead focusing more on the ‘predominance’ criteria set out in Rule 23(b).”); Mullen v.
Treasure Chest Casino, L.L.C., 186 F.3d 620, 625 (5th Cir. 1999); Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150
F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that the requirement of commonality is “minimal”).
39. Typicality requires that the claims of the named plaintiff be typical of the claims of the class
as a whole. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). The typicality requirement has historically not been rigorous in
application, and the claims of the class representatives need not be identical to the class as a whole,
as long as a “class members need to advance legal theories that are similar, if not identical to those
advanced by named plaintiffs.” Lightbourn v. Cnty. of El Paso, 118 F.3d 421, 426 (5th Cir. 1997);
accord Paxton v. Union Nat’l Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 561 (8th Cir. 1982) (“The rule does not require
that every question of law or fact be common to every member of the class.”).
40. Adequacy of representation requires that class representatives “fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). In contrast to the more liberal application of the
other factors, courts typically apply greater scrutiny as to whether the adequacy of representation
requirement is satisfied. See Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV.
1183, 1186–91 (1982). Any evidence of a conflict of interest or potential conflict of interest among
the class representatives and class as a whole will prevent Rule 23(a)(4) from being satisfied.
Retired Chi. Police Ass’n v. City of Chi., 7 F.3d 584, 598 (7th Cir. 1993).
41. Black v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 173 F.R.D. 156, 159 (S.D. W. Va. 1996); Kidwell v. Transp.
Commc’ns Int’l Union, 946 F.2d 283, 305 (4th Cir. 1991).
42. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997).
43. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2545 (2011).
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achieve certification. 44 Rule 23(b) provides four ways to maintain a class
action. 45 For the purposes of this Comment, the most important
subsections of Rule 23(b) are Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3), which are
the two paths most commonly used in consumer cases. 46 Rule 23(b)(2)
allows a court to grant injunctive relief where “the party opposing the
class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the
class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is
appropriate.” 47 As Part II of this Comment discusses further, Dukes
dramatically changed the way Rule 23(b)(2) can be used and limits this
category to claims for declarative or injunctive relief.48
The last category, Rule 23(b)(3), allows litigants to seek monetary
damages where “questions of law or fact common to the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,” and
where a class action “is superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” 49 Additionally, the court must
also consider “the likely difficulties in managing the class action.”50
Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement poses particular challenges
for large consumer classes seeking certification. 51 Recently, courts have
rigorously enforced the requirement that common issues of law and fact
“predominate” over individual issues. 52 This has been fatal for
certification of many consumer cases, in which courts have held that the
44. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
45. Id. The first category, Rule 23(b)(1)(A), is for situations where separate actions would create
a risk of “inconsistent or varying adjudications.” Id. 23(b)(1)(A). The second category, Rule
23(b)(1)(B), is satisfied where “adjudications with respect to individual class members” would be
“dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or
would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.” Id. 23(b)(1)(B).
46. See Romberg, supra note 1, at 259 n.42.
47. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
48. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2545.
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). To aid in this inquiry, Rule 23(b)(3) provides the following four
factors for the court to consider: “(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of the separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in
managing a class action.” Id.
50. Id. 23(b)(3)(D).
51. See Romberg, supra note 1, at 261 (“Rule 23(b)(3) therefore imposes two specific
requirements not applicable to (b)(1) or (b)(2) . . . . It is on the shoals of predominance and
superiority that most class actions founder.”).
52. Jenna G. Farleigh, Splitting the Baby: Standardizing Issue Class Certification, 64 VAND. L.
REV. 1585, 1598 (2011); see also Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433–34
(2013) (denying certification because plaintiff’s economic model failed to show that damages were
measurable on a class-wide basis).
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individual nature of damages precludes a finding that common issues
predominate over individual issues. 53
Mass tort and consumer class actions present unique challenges for
determining whether class certification is appropriate. 54 The Supreme
Court has not ruled out the use of class actions in these contexts but
acknowledges the difficulty in adopting bright line rules to govern
certification analysis. 55 As the Court noted in Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor, 56 “[i]n the decades since the 1966 revision of Rule 23, classaction practice has become ever more ‘adventuresome’ as a means of
coping with claims too numerous to secure their ‘just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination’ one by one.” 57 In Amchem, the Court
rejected certification of a settlement-only class, based on the fact that the
class did not meet the adequacy and predominance requirements of Rule
23. 58 The Court further noted that while the Advisory Committee for
Rule 23 advised that mass accident cases are ordinarily not appropriate
for class treatment, “the text of the Rule does not categorically exclude
mass tort cases from class certification.” 59 The Court concluded that “the
Committee’s warning, however, continues to call for caution when
individual stakes are high and disparities among class members are
great.” 60 Amchem continues to be highly influential and has severely
limited the availability of Rule 23(b)(3) certification for consumer
classes. 61

53. See Romberg, supra note 1, at 261; see also Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1433–34.
54. See HAZARD ET AL., supra note 34, at 837 n.2.
55. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 618–19 (1997).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 617–18.
58. Id. at 624.
59. Id. at 625.
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 424 (4th Cir. 2003). In Gunnells,
the court explained:
However, as the Supreme Court has noted, the predominance and superiority requirements in
Rule 23(b)(3) do not foreclose the possibility of mass tort class actions, but merely ensure that
class certification in such cases “achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and
promote . . . uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing
procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.”
Id. (quoting Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 615).
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EXPANSION IN FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER CLASS
ACTIONS HIGHLIGHTS THE NEED FOR UNIFORM
INTERPRETATION OF RULE 23

The need to achieve uniform interpretation of Rule 23 is further
compounded by recent expansion in federal jurisdiction over class
actions, as well as an amendment to Rule 23 allowing for immediate
appeal of class certification decisions. As will be discussed in greater
detail below, the expansion of federal jurisdiction over class actions,
easier removal to federal court, and interlocutory review of certification
decisions encourage forum shopping and highlight the need to achieve a
more uniform interpretation of Rule 23. 62
The enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) 63
significantly changed class-action practice and has further heightened
concerns about judicial efficiency surrounding class actions in federal
courts. 64 CAFA expanded federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction by (1)
allowing removal beyond the traditional one-year limit, (2) allowing
removal by a defendant who is a citizen of the state where the suit was
initiated, (3) allowing a defendant to remove without first obtaining the
consent of other co-defendants, and (4) exempting litigants from the
complete diversity requirement so long as the aggregate amount in
controversy exceeds $5 million. 65 In addition to CAFA, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc. 66
expanded traditional diversity jurisdiction over class actions by requiring
only one plaintiff to meet the $75,000 amount in controversy
requirement. 67 CAFA’s general removal provisions may cause plaintiffs
who fear removal to federal court to forego bringing an action in state
court, choosing instead to litigate in federal jurisdictions with more
generous approaches to certification. 68 CAFA’s removal provisions
make it easier for litigants to forum shop, thereby exacerbating the
circuit split between the Fifth Circuit and “friendlier” circuits, such as
the Second, Seventh, and Ninth, and could lead to an inundation of class

62. See Farleigh, supra note 52, at 1590.
63. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–15 (2006)).
64. Farleigh, supra note 52, at 1590.
65. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b).
66. 545 U.S. 546 (2005).
67. Id.
68. Farleigh, supra note 52, at 1590.
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certification requests in those circuits. 69
Additionally, Rule 23(f) was modified in 1998 to provide for
interlocutory review of class-certification decisions.70 The text of the
rule gives courts of appeals great latitude to grant or deny review of
certification orders, and courts have developed several different tests to
determine when interlocutory review is important. 71 The advisory
committee notes cite the various “concerns” associated with class-action
jurisprudence as justification for “expansion of present opportunities to
appeal.” 72 The ability of litigants to seek interlocutory review of class
certification decisions and the difficulty courts have encountered in
determining when review is appropriate, create further incentives to
achieve uniform interpretation of Rule 23 to reduce the burden of
certification review in federal courts. 73
III. RECENT SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE LEAVES THE
FUTURE OF CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS UNSETTLED
As discussed in Part I of this Comment, prior to Dukes, courts had
largely interpreted Rule 23(a)’s prerequisites liberally and did not apply
a more exacting inquiry above and beyond what the text of the rule
required. 74 Dukes was a landmark departure from this approach and
greatly enhanced the level of scrutiny applied at the Rule 23(a)
analysis. 75 To many, Dukes signaled the death of mass-consumer class
actions. 76 However, the Court’s 2013 decisions in Amgen and Comcast
Corp. reflect differing approaches to class-certification analysis that

69. Id.
70. Lori Irish Bauman, Class Certification and Interlocutory Review: Rule 23(f) in the Courts, 9
J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 205, 207 (2007).
71. Id. at 208.
72. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note (1998).
73. Id. 23(f); Bauman, supra note 70, at 208 (discussing how the Advisory Committee “straddled
the fence” by recognizing the lack of uniformity and high stakes in class certification decisions
while also attempting to protect judicial efficiency by preventing unnecessary appeals).
74. See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1194–95 (2013)
(discussing how Dukes firmly established that the Rule 23(a) prerequisites would be analyzed
“rigorously,” but cautioning that rigorous analysis does not authorize “free-ranging merits inquiries
at the certification stage”).
75. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011).
76. Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Failing Faith in Class Actions: Dukes v. WalMart and AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 73, 77 (2011)
(discussing the impact of Dukes: “[t]he larger concern is that big companies know that it will be
much harder to sue them in class actions, and the unscrupulous ones will more often make the
choice to enrich themselves at the expense of consumers and employees”).
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courts must now reconcile. 77 These decisions, discussed in greater detail
below, highlight the uncertainty surrounding certification of mass
consumer classes and make a compelling case for the increased use of
issue class certification pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4). 78
A.

The Landmark Decision: Wal-Mart v. Dukes Heightens the
Commonality Requirement

In 2011, the Supreme Court decided Wal-Mart v. Dukes. 79 Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, denied class certification for 1.5 million
female Wal-Mart employees who alleged gender-based employment
discrimination under Title VII. 80 The plaintiffs sought injunctive and
declaratory relief, punitive damages, and back pay under Rule 23(b)(2).
Although this was an employment discrimination case, the ruling has
important and far-reaching consequences for all class actions because
the Court’s determinations apply to all applications of Rule 23,
regardless of the underlying cause of action. 81
Prior to Dukes, most lawyers pursuing or defending class-action
claims for damages focused not on contesting Rule 23(a)’s commonality
requirement, but instead on whether common issues predominated.82
Dukes, however, focused on commonality, and the Court ultimately
determined that the 1.5 million Wal-Mart employees did not satisfy this
requirement. 83 The text of Rule 23(a)(2) provides that “[o]ne or more
members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on
behalf of all members only if . . . there are questions of law or fact
common to the class.” 84 The Court interpreted this provision to also
require the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members “have
suffered the same injury.” 85 The Court noted that class members cannot

77. See Glazer v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 10-4188, 2013 WL 3746205, at *25–26 (6th Cir. July 18,
2013) (discussing the impact of Amgen and Comcast Corp. on Rule 23(b)’s predominance
requirement).
78. See Linda S. Mullenix, Class Action Cacophony at the Supreme Court, 35 NAT’L L. J. 28
(2013) (discussing how the Court’s decisions in Amgen and Comcast Corp. reflect the Court’s
liberal and conservative divide, but broke no new ground regarding black-letter class certification
doctrines).
79. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
80. Id. at 2541.
81. See Comodeca & Hils, supra note 5, at *3.
82. Id.
83. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
84. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
85. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
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prove the same injury has been suffered by showing “merely that they
have all suffered a violation of the same provision of law,” which prior
to this decision, had been sufficient to satisfy commonality. 86
The Court held that to satisfy commonality, the claims must depend
on a common contention—namely, the assertion of discriminatory bias
on the part of the same supervisor—rather than varied examples of
potentially discretionary decisions by managers at various levels of
hierarchy in the Wal-Mart corporation. 87 The Court articulated a new
test for the “commonality” requirement:
That common contention, moreover, must be of such a nature
that it is capable of classwide resolution—which means that
determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is
central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke. 88
The Court asserted that the inquiry at the certification stage should
focus not on asking common questions, but instead, on the ability of
common answers to fairly resolve the litigation for the class as a
whole. 89
The Court further articulated that Rule 23(b)(2) is meant only to
address those indivisible harms that apply evenly to all members of the
class. 90 Consequently, the Court determined that Rule 23(b)(2) does not
authorize class certification when each class member would be entitled
to an individualized award of monetary damages. 91 This meant that had
the class survived certification, it would only have been entitled to an
award of injunctive or declaratory relief under Rule 23(b)(2) and money
damages incidental to that injury, such as attorney’s fees. To obtain
monetary damages, the plaintiffs would have to seek additional
certification under Rule 23(b)(3). However, the Court suggested that
such an attempt would be fruitless, as the individual nature of the
plaintiffs’ injuries would surely fail Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance
inquiry. 92
Immediately following Dukes, courts saw a flood of motions for
decertification. 93 While it is clear that Dukes heightened the
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2557.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2559.
93. See Brooks-Crozier, supra note 6, at 718 (discussing courts’ struggle to make sense of
Dukes).

14 - Smith Comment.docx (Do Not Delete)

2013]

REFRAMING CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS

10/10/2013 5:27 PM

1199

commonality requirement, 94 recent certification decisions 95 validate
Justice Ginsburg’s concern that the new commonality standard “mimics
the Rule 23(b)(3) inquiry into whether common questions ‘predominate’
over individual issues.” 96 According to Justice Ginsburg, Dukes’ impact
is problematic for two reasons: first, when courts focus on uncovering
dissimilarities among the class at the Rule 23(a)(2) stage, “no mission
remains for Rule 23(b)(3)”; 97 and second, applying what was effectively
the predominance requirement from Rule 23(b)(3) at the 23(a)(2) stage
imposes additional requirements on Rule 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(2)
classes above and beyond what Rule 23’s framers intended.98
Additionally, Dukes pushes any claims for monetary relief into the realm
of Rule 23(b)(3). 99 The combined effects of Dukes have made it
increasingly difficult for consumer class actions to achieve certification
under the traditional approach, thereby making the use of bifurcation to
achieve certification on certain issues more appealing and necessary than
ever before.
B.

Amgen: Retrenching from Dukes

For class-action plaintiffs, the Court’s 2013 decision in Amgen 100 was
a welcome departure from Dukes. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the six
justice majority, which also included Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices
Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan. 101 Amgen involved a claim for
securities fraud, with the Court holding that plaintiffs invoking the
“fraud-on-the-market” presumption of reliance need not establish the
element of materiality to obtain certification in a federal-securities class
action. 102 The Court’s analysis focused on whether Rule 23(b)(3)’s
predominance requirement was satisfied:
Rule 23(b)(3) requires a showing that questions common to the
class predominate, not that those questions will be answered, on
94. See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1194 (2013)
(discussing how Dukes heightened the requirements for certification).
95. See Brooks-Crozier, supra note 6, at 719 (“Courts’ certification decisions since Dukes bear
out Justice Ginsburg’s argument.”).
96. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2566 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2565–66.
99. Id. at 2557 (majority opinion) (holding that classes certified under Rule 23(b)(2) may seek
only injunctive relief and incidental money damages).
100. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1195 (2013).
101. Id. at 1190.
102. Id. at 1195–96.
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the merits, in favor of the class. Because materiality is judged
according to an objective standard, the materiality of [the
company]’s alleged misrepresentations and omissions is a
question common to all members of the class [the retirement
plan] would represent. The alleged misrepresentations and
omissions, whether material or immaterial, would be so equally
for all investors composing the class. As vital, the plaintiff
class’s inability to prove materiality would not result in
individual questions predominating. Instead, a failure of proof
on the issue of materiality would end the case, given that
materiality is an essential element of the class members’
securities-fraud claims. As to materiality, therefore, the class is
entirely cohesive: It will prevail or fail in unison. In no event
will the individual circumstances of particular class members
bear on the inquiry. 103
Although Amgen’s holding is limited to securities-fraud class actions
involving the “fraud-on-the-market” presumption, the Court’s reasoning
suggests that the Court will not continue to ratchet up certification
requirements beyond what the text of Rule 23 requires. Amgen can be
read to put the brakes on Dukes: while Dukes held that the plaintiffs
must raise issues that are common to the entire class,104 Amgen held that
as long as common questions are asked, they need not be answered at the
certification stage. 105 The majority articulated that distinction in the
following way: “Rule 23 grants courts no license to engage in freeranging merits inquiries at the certification stage. Merits questions may
be considered to the extent—but only the extent—that they are relevant
to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification
are satisfied.” 106
The dissent, written by Justice Thomas and joined by Justices Scalia
and Kennedy, asserted that the plaintiffs bore the burden of establishing
all of the elements of their case at the certification stage, including the
element of materiality.
Without demonstrating materiality at certification, plaintiffs
cannot establish Basic’s fraud-on-the-market presumption.
Without proof of fraud on the market, plaintiffs cannot show
that otherwise individualized questions of reliance will
predominate, as required by Rule 23(b)(3). And without
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 1191.
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1195.
Id. at 1194–95.
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satisfying Rule 23(b)(3), class certification is improper. 107
The victory for plaintiffs seeking certification was short-lived because
the Supreme Court soon revisited the question of how intensely courts
would consider the merits of a case at the certification stage in Comcast
Corp. 108
C.

Comcast Corp. Further Unsettles the Future of Mass Consumer
Claims

A few weeks after Amgen, the issue of looking beyond the pleadings
at the certification stage reappeared in Comcast Corp. 109 Justice Scalia
wrote for the majority, which included the Chief Justice, and Justices
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. 110 In Comcast Corp., the Court reversed
the Third Circuit’s decision to certify a class in an antitrust action where
the class failed to show that damages could be calculated on a class-wide
basis through a common methodology. 111 Drawing heavily upon Dukes,
the Court held that the regression model developed by the plaintiffs’
expert was not acceptable as proof that damages were susceptible to
measurement on a class-wide basis, and emphasized that proving classwide damages was essential to satisfying the predominance criteria of
Rule 23(b)(3). 112 The Court faulted the Third Circuit for refusing to
“entertain arguments against respondents’ damages model that bore on
the propriety of class certification simply because they would also be
pertinent to the merits determination” to consider the evidence of how
damages would be calculated. 113 The Court reasoned that in some
circumstances, “the Court may have to probe behind the pleadings
before coming to rest on the certification question.” 114
The dissent, written by Justice Ginsburg and joined by Justices
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, cautioned that Comcast Corp. should
have been dismissed as improvidently granted. 115 Justice Ginsburg
107. Id. at 1206 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
108. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1434 (2013).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1432–33.
114. Id. at 1432 (internal quotations omitted).
115. Id. at 1436 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The Court granted review to address the question of
“[w]hether a district court may certify a class action without resolving whether the plaintiff class has
introduced admissible evidence, including expert testimony, to show that the case is susceptible to
awarding damages on a class-wide basis.” Id. at 1431 n.4 (majority opinion). In response, the parties
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further argued that the Comcast Corp. decision failed to break any new
ground in class-action jurisprudence, as it “remains the ‘black letter rule’
that a class may obtain certification under Rule 23(b)(3) when liability
questions common to the class predominate over damages questions
unique to class members.” 116 Justice Ginsburg explained that Rule 23
does not require “commonality as to all questions,” but rather, “when
adjudication of questions of liability common to the class will achieve
economies of time and expense, the predominance standard is generally
satisfied even if damages are not provable in the aggregate.” 117 Quoting
the Advisory Committee’s 1966 Note on Rule 23, Justice Ginsburg
explicitly highlighted the continued vitality of issue class certification:
[A] fraud perpetrated on numerous persons by the use of similar
misrepresentations may be an appealing situation for a class
action, and it may remain so despite the need, if liability is
found, for separate determination of the damages suffered by
individuals within the class. 118
While the ideological split among the Justices makes it difficult to
predict future trends impacting class certification, these recent decisions
highlight the importance of carving out common issues for class
certification. 119 As both Comcast Corp. and Amgen illustrate, the Court
will not hesitate to transform issues involving the merits of a claim into a
Rule 23(b) predominance analysis. 120 Therefore, using Rule 23(c)(4) to
carve out issues that more easily satisfy Rule 23’s prerequisites enables
litigants to avoid a more searching inquiry into the merits of a claim at
the certification stage.
devoted much of their briefing to the issue of whether the standards governing the admissibility of
expert testimony set forth by Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), apply in certification proceedings. See generally Brief
for Petitioner, Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013) (No. 11-864), 2012 WL
3613365; Brief for Respondent, Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013) (No.
11-864), 2011 WL 9153773. The Court eventually realized, however, that Comcast failed to
preserve the issue of admissibility of expert testimony for review. Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. at
1436–37.
116. Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1437 (quoting 2 W. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS
ACTIONS § 4:54, at 205 (5th ed. 2012)) (“ordinarily, ‘individual damage[s] calculations should not
scuttle class certification under Rule 23(b)(3)’” (quoting RUBENSTEIN, supra)).
117. Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1437.
118. Id. (quoting 7AA CHARLES ALLAN ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1781, at
235–37 (3d ed. 2005)).
119. See Mullenix, supra note 78, at 2 (“The Amgen and Comcast Corp. decisions are nonetheless
striking for their similar embrace of fundamental class certification principles, relying on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes . . . .”).
120. Id. (“Ironically, in Amgen and Comcast Corp., Ginsburg and Scalia performed the same
sleight-of-hand trick, transforming the ‘merits’ problem into a Rule 23(b)(3) analysis.”).
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IV. THE USE OF RULE 23(C)(4) TO ALLOW CERTIFICATION
WITH RESPECT TO DISCRETE ISSUES IS HIGHLY
CONTROVERSIAL AND HAS GENERATED A CIRCUIT
SPLIT
Bifurcation is a tool that courts may use to break a single lawsuit into
separate issues. 121 Rule 42(b) allows district courts broad discretion to
bifurcate a single lawsuit into separate trials if bifurcation will promote
efficiency, judicial economy, or avoid prejudice. 122 Rule 23(c)(4)
specifically allows bifurcation in class actions. 123 The Rule provides that
“when appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a class
action with respect to particular issues.” 124 This allows litigants to seek
certification with respect to certain issues, while allowing other issues to
proceed on an individual basis. 125 The most commonly used type of
bifurcation in class action litigation is bifurcation on the issue of a
defendant’s liability. 126 If liability is established, damages will then be
determined in individual proceedings. 127 If the plaintiffs do not prevail
on the issue of liability, the litigation ends. 128 In a bifurcated class
action, absent class members are typically obligated to “opt in” to
resolve all remaining individual issues. 129 Bifurcation, both in the class
action context and litigation more generally, has become a relatively
common means of managing complex lawsuits. 130 Generally, the term
“bifurcation” applies where “common and individual issues for all class

121. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b).
122. Id.; Farleigh, supra note 52, at 1596.
123. See Farleigh, supra note 52, at 1596. Bifurcation pursuant to Rule 42(a) differs from issue
class certification in three primary ways: bifurcation results in only one judgment, it applies in nonclass-action lawsuits, and it may utilize a single jury. Id. Additionally, bifurcation generally only
separates liability and damages determinations, whereas issue certification can divide litigation in a
multitude of ways. Id.
124. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4).
125. See McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 483 (7th Cir.
2012), cert. denied, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 338 (2012) (allowing certification only on the issue of
liability, while leaving the question of certification for a damages class for a later proceeding).
126. Romberg, supra note 1, at 266.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 263; see also Stephen S. Gensler, Bifurcation Unbound, 75 WASH. L. REV. 705, 722
(2000) (“The clear consensus is that bifurcation offers huge potential trial savings in multi-plaintiff,
complex litigation because the resolution of a common issue can eliminate the need for hundreds or
thousands of separate trials to resolve individual issues.”).
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members . . . are resolved in multiple stages of the same lawsuit.” 131 As
one commentator described it, bifurcation allows “the court to cut up a
huge meal into bite-sized chunks.” 132
Increasingly, litigants have sought certification of “partial class
actions” or “hybrid class actions” in which the court certifies only the
common issues in the case for collective resolution.133 While this often
involves certification on the issue of liability, a key distinction is that in
a partial class action, after the common issues are resolved, the suit ends
for absent class members. 134 Absent class members never directly
participate in the class lawsuit itself; rather, after the common issue has
been tried, they may file their own individual actions, relying on the
preclusive effect of the resolution of the common issue. 135 Another key
distinction between a bifurcated class action and a “partial class action”
is that bifurcation implies a two-step division of a case between the issue
of liability and damages, whereas a partial class action may involve a
number of different divisions and need not be limited to the division of
liability and damages. 136 This Comment addresses the certification
challenges faced by both bifurcated and partial class actions.
Rule 23(c)(4) was adopted along with other major amendments to
Rule 23 in 1966. However, until the late 1980s, courts and practitioners
largely ignored Rule 23(c)(4), instead choosing to decide certification
based on the litigation as a whole. 137 As the requirements for traditional
certification have been heightened, litigants are increasingly turning to
Rule 23(c)(4) issue class certification. 138 Currently, appellate and district
courts are struggling with the boundaries of issue class certification, and
there is a three-way circuit split regarding the proper interpretation of
Rule 23(c)(4)’s language. 139

131. Romberg, supra note 1, at 266.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 266–67.
134. Id. at 266.
135. Id. at 266–67; see also Edward F. Sherman, Segmenting Aggregate Litigation: Initiatives
and Impediments for Reshaping the Trial Process, 25 REV. LITIG. 691, 706–09 (2006) (discussing
the differences in bifurcated class actions and hybrid class actions in greater depth).
136. See Sherman, supra note 134, at 706–07.
137. See Farleigh, supra note 52, at 1595.
138. Brooks-Crozier, supra note 6, at 731 (discussing courts’ treatment of 23(c)(4) post-Dukes);
Laura J. Hines, The Dangerous Allure of the Issue Class Action, 79 IND. L.J. 567, 582 (2004)
(discussing the paucity of decisions involving Rule 23(c)(4) pre-Dukes).
139. See Farleigh, supra note 52, at 1623.
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The Fifth Circuit Rejects the Use of Rule 23(c)(4) if the Claim as a
Whole Does Not Satisfy Rule 23

In the Fifth Circuit, “a cause of action, as a whole, must satisfy the
predominance requirement of (b)(3).” 140 Castano v. American Tobacco
Co. 141 acknowledged that Rule 23(c)(4) can be used in some
circumstances to overcome discrete differences among the class or
discrete issues that share a more common nucleus of operative fact;
however, the court cautioned that:
Severing the defendants’ conduct from reliance under [R]ule
23(c)(4) does not save the class action. A district court cannot
manufacture predominance through the nimble use of
subdivision (c)(4). The proper interpretation of the interaction
between subdivisions (b)(3) and (c)(4) is that . . . (c)(4) is a
housekeeping rule that allows courts to sever the common issues
for a class trial. 142
The court noted that reading Rule 23(c)(4) to allow a court to sever
issues until the “remaining common issue predominates over the
remaining individual issues would eviscerate the predominance
requirement of [R]ule 23(b)(3); the result would be automatic
certification in every case where there is a common issue, a result that
could not have been intended.” 143
Some commentators endorse the Fifth Circuit’s view, and describe
Rule 23(c)(4) as “merely a ‘housekeeping tool,’ not a mechanism to
circumvent other Rule 23 requirements.” 144 In support of this position,
scholars cite Rule 23(c)(4)’s placement in subdivision (c) of Rule 23 as
reflecting a “managerial rather than a primary role for (c)(4)(A).” 145
Additionally, they note that “[n]one of the other subdivision (c)
provisions alter the terms under which a (b) class action may be
140. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting certification
of a class of millions of persons and their family members who had incurred illness or died from
using tobacco products; the widespread variability in the amount of exposure, type of tobacco use,
and types and degree of disease were fatal to the plaintiffs’ request).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Laura J. Hines, Challenging the Issue Class Action End-Run, 52 EMORY L.J. 709, 711
(2003); see also Linda S. Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed Federal
Procedure Act, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1039, 1059 (1986) (discussing that partial certification for mass tort
cases is never appropriate because these cases cannot meet Rule 23(a)’s requirements).
145. Hines, supra note 144, at 719 (noting that other provisions in subdivision (c) include notice
for (b)(3) class actions, timing of class certification, division of subclasses, and binding nature of
class action judgments).
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certified, or provide independent authority to certify an alternative type
of class action.” 146 They argue that if Rule 23(c)(4) was intended to
authorize a fourth path for class certification, it would not be contained
within subsection (c), but would occupy a more prominent place within
Rule 23. 147 Some scholars suggest that recent appellate decisions show
that issue class certification is falling out of favor in the courts. 148 Others
counter, and this author agrees, that these decisions reflect case-specific
concerns such as choice-of-law and Seventh Amendment concerns,
rather than a general opposition to the issue class mechanism. 149
B.

Most Circuits Allow Bifurcation Under Rule 23(c)(4) to Certify
Issue Classes, Even Where the Claim as a Whole Does Not Satisfy
Rule 23

The majority of circuits support a more liberal approach to issue class
certification. The First, 150 Second, 151 Fourth, 152 Sixth, 153 Seventh, 154
Ninth, 155 Tenth, 156 and Eleventh 157 Circuits allow the use of Rule
146. Id.
147. Hines, supra note 137, at 586–87.
148. John C. Coffee, Jr. & Daniel Wolf, Class Certification: Trends and Developments Over the
Last Five Years (2004-2009), in 13TH ANNUAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON CLASS ACTIONS F-20, F108-F-109, 1 at 104–09, (A.B.A. ed., 2009).
149. See Farleigh, supra note 52, at 1601.
150. Tardiff v. Knox Cnty., 365 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding predominance was not defeated
merely by the need for individualized damage decisions where there were still disputed common
issues as to liability).
151. In re Nassau Cnty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 226–27 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that
district court exceeded its discretion by failing to certify a class on the issue of liability pursuant to
Rules 23(b)(3) and 23(c)(4)(A)).
152. Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 441 (4th Cir. 2003) (affirming conditional
certification of some claims and decertifying on other claims where reliance and the need for
individual inquiry precluded a finding of predominance).
153. Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1197 (6th Cir. 1988) (affirming
certification on issue of liability where cause of groundwater pollution was a single course of
conduct that was identical to all plaintiffs, but cautioning that not all claims of property damage or
exposure are alike).
154. Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 912 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming certification
of issue class on issue of liability and extent of contamination, but leaving damages to be tried
individually).
155. Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Even if the common
questions do not predominate over the individual questions so that class certification of the entire
action is warranted, Rule 23 authorizes the district court in appropriate cases to isolate the common
issues under Rule 23(c)(4)(A) and proceed with class treatment of these particular issues.”).
156. Wallace B. Roderick Revocable Living Trust v. XTO Energy, Inc., No. 12-3776, 2013 WL
3389469, at *5 (10th Cir. July 9, 2013) (discussing the availability of 23(c)(4) to isolate common
issues, but vacating and remanding the certification order because plaintiffs failed to show that
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23(c)(4) to single out certain issues for class treatment, even if the cause
of action as a whole does not satisfy Rule 23(b)(3).
Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit is an influential voice on
class actions and has emerged as one of the leading proponents of issue
class certification. 158 Judge Posner’s approach to bifurcation is perhaps
best exemplified in Mejdrech v. Met Coil Systems Corp: 159
[C]lass action treatment is appropriate and is permitted by Rule
23 when the judicial economy from consolidation of separate
claims outweighs any concern with possible inaccuracies from
their being lumped together in a single proceeding for decision
by a single judge or jury. Often, and as it seems to us here, these
competing considerations can be reconciled in a “mass tort” case
by carving at the joints of the parties’ dispute. If there are
genuinely common issues, issues identical across all the
claimants, issues moreover the accuracy of the resolution of
which is unlikely to be enhanced by repeated proceedings, then
it makes good sense, especially when the class is so large, to
resolve those issues in one fell swoop while leaving the
remaining, claimant-specific issues to individual follow-on
proceedings. 160
1.

McReynolds Represents the Best Path Forward for Consumer
Class Actions

In 2012, one year after Dukes, the Seventh Circuit issued a highly
anticipated decision in McReynolds. 161 While Dukes signaled the
Supreme Court’s hesitancy to allow clever tactics to avoid compliance
with Rule 23, the Seventh Circuit used Rule 23(c)(4) to carve the
plaintiffs’ disparate impact claims into common issues that were
consistent with Dukes’ heightened commonality requirement. 162
In McReynolds, 700 African-American Merrill Lynch employees
damages were measurable on a class-wide basis); see also Fulghum v. Embarq Corp., No. 07–2602–
EFM, 2011 WL 13615, at *2 (D. Kan. Jan. 4, 2011); Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 167
F.R.D. 178, 184–85 (D. Kan. 1996) (district courts within the Tenth Circuit applying Rule 23(c)(4)
where claim as a whole did not satisfy predominance).
157. See Williams v. Mohawk Indus. Inc., 568 F.3d 1350, 1359–60 (11th Cir. 2009) (remanding
case for determination of whether common issues predominated over individual issues and whether
hybrid class for injunctive relief was appropriate).
158. See HAZARD ET AL., supra note 34, at 839.
159. 319 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2003).
160. Id. at 911 (emphasis added).
161. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2012).
162. Id. at 484.
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alleged that two Merrill Lynch operating policies had a disparate impact
on African-American brokers. 163 Under the company’s “teaming
policy,” brokers in the same office had the option of forming teams for
the purpose of sharing clients and gaining access to additional clients.164
The second policy challenged was the “account distribution” policy,
which allowed brokers to compete for the clients of departing brokers. 165
The plaintiffs sought certification for two purposes. 166 They first sought
certification for injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2), alleging that
Merrill Lynch engaged in practices that had a disparate impact on the
700 African-American potential class members. 167 Although the class
members intended to seek compensatory and punitive damages under
Rule 23(b)(3), they did not seek certification of the Rule 23(b)(3) class
at the same time as the Rule 23(b)(2) class. 168 Consequently, the court’s
ruling focused only on whether the requirements for certification under
Rule 23(b)(2) had been met—the putative class did not have to
overcome Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance and superiority hurdles. 169
The court distinguished the McReynolds plaintiffs’ claims from those
in Dukes based on the fact that the McReynolds plaintiffs challenged two
specific company policies that had an allegedly discriminatory impact.170
By contrast, in Dukes, the plaintiffs did not allege that any top-down
corporate policy was responsible for their injuries. 171 As the court
articulated:
But in a disparate impact case the presence or absence of
discriminatory intent is irrelevant; and permitting brokers to
form their own teams and prescribing criteria for account
distributions that favor the already successful—those who may
owe their success to having been invited to join a successful or
promising team—are practices of Merrill Lynch, rather than
practices that local managers can choose or not at their whim.
Therefore challenging those practices in a class action is not
forbidden by the Wal-Mart decision; rather that decision helps
(as the district judge sensed) to show on which side of the line
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Id. at 488.
Id. at 488–89.
Id. at 483.
Id. at 483, 488.
Id. at 483.
Id. at 488.
Id.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011).
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that separates a company-wide practice from an exercise of
discretion by local managers this case falls. 172
The court found that the “incremental causal effect . . . of those
company-wide-policies—which is the alleged disparate impact—could
be most efficiently determined on a class-wide basis.” 173 Thus, the court
concluded that granting certification on the issue of injunctive relief
under Rule 23(b)(2) was appropriate. 174 Once the issue of liability was
decided in the Rule 23(b)(2) class proceeding, the plaintiffs would have
to seek certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) damages class, or litigate the
issue of damages individually. 175
The court explained that the propriety of bifurcation under Rule
23(c)(4) depends on the circumstances of each individual case.176 While
the court acknowledged that the issues of compensatory damages and
predominance under Rule 23(b)(3) might be difficult to achieve on a
class-wide basis, those issues were not before the court, and the
relatively high amount of damages sought would justify allowing
individual proceedings. 177 Ultimately, the court determined that partial
class certification was warranted because liability would “most
efficiently be determined on a class-wide basis, rather than in 700
individual lawsuits.” 178
In dicta, the court provided guidance as to when partial certification
under Rule 23(c)(4) is appropriate. The court cautioned that
consolidating the issue of liability into one class proceeding might not be
appropriate “if enormous consequences ride on that resolution.” 179 In
some cases, there is a more obvious danger “that resolving an issue
common to hundreds of different claimants in a single proceeding may
make too much turn on the decision of a single, fallible judge or jury.” 180
The court warned that the alternative might prove equally dangerous,
with the risk that common issues could be decided in hundreds of
different proceedings, burdening the judicial system and resulting in
very disparate outcomes. 181 Balancing these factors in McReynolds, the
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 490.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 491.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 483.
Id. at 491; see also In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1020 (7th Cir. 2002).
McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 491.
Id.
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court felt that these dangers were best remedied by having separate trials
on pecuniary relief, rather than denying certification of all issues. 182
The court also noted that the amount of damages at issue and the
complexity in proving those damages should be considered when
evaluating the viability of bifurcation. 183 In McReynolds, the damages
sustained would be relatively easy to prove and were large enough to
justify individual suits.184 Where no glaring difficulties in conducting
individual suits for damages were apparent, the court had “trouble seeing
the downside of the limited class action treatment” and reversed the
district court’s denial of class certification under Rules 23(b)(2) and
23(c)(4). 185 After Merrill Lynch’s appeal to the Supreme Court was
denied, the parties reached a settlement in August 2013 in which Merrill
Lynch agreed to pay $160 million—the largest settlement in U.S. history
for a racial discrimination case against an American employer. 186
The McReynolds decision is a high-profile interpretation of the
heightened class certification requirements established in Dukes, and
further exacerbates the conflicting application of Rule 23(c)(4) among
circuit courts. Litigants will likely flock to circuits that follow the
Seventh Circuit’s approach. Rather than read McReynolds as a sweeping
endorsement of issue class certification, litigants should take note of the
practical framing of the issues, particular issues of law involved, and
relative simplicity with which individual damages could be calculated as
important factors that tipped the scales in favor of allowing issue class
certification.
C.

The Third Circuit Applies a Balancing Test to Determine when
Bifurcation Is Appropriate

After acknowledging the conflict among other circuits, in 2011, the
Third Circuit applied the factors set forth in the American Legal
Institute’s (ALI) Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation 187 to
determine when certification of an issue class is appropriate. 188 The
Third Circuit instructed courts to consider:
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 492.
185. Id.
186. Patrick McGeehan, Merrill Lynch in Big Payout for Bias Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2013,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/27/merrill-lynch-in-big-payout-for-bias-case/.
187. See A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION §§ 2.02–2.05, 2.07–2.08
(2010).
188. See Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255, 273 (3d Cir. 2011).
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[T]he type of claim(s) and issue(s) in question; the overall
complexity of the case; the efficiencies to be gained by granting
partial certification in light of realistic procedural alternatives;
the substantive law underlying the claim(s), including any
choice-of-law questions it may present and whether the
substantive law separates the common issue(s) from other issues
concerning liability or remedy; the impact partial certification
will have on the constitutional and statutory rights of both the
class members and the defendant(s); the potential preclusive
effect or lack thereof that resolution of the proposed issue class
will have; the repercussions certification of an issue(s) class will
have on the effectiveness and fairness of resolution of remaining
issues; the impact individual proceedings may have upon one
another, including whether remedies are indivisible such that
granting or not granting relief to any claimant as a practical
matter determines the claims of others; and the kind of evidence
presented on the remaining issues, including the risk subsequent
triers of fact will need to reexamine evidence and findings from
resolution of the common issue(s). 189
These considerations are not exhaustive, and should be used to guide
courts as they apply Rule 23(c)(4) to “treat common things in common
and to distinguish the distinguishable.” 190
As the next section of this Comment discusses, although the ALI
factors are rarely mentioned in decisions, they provide helpful guidance
as to when issue class certification is appropriate. 191 Many of these
factors have been considered by courts in other jurisdictions, and can
help courts balance the interests of efficiency and judicial economy with
the black letter requirements of Rule 23. 192 The Third Circuit’s approach
is consistent with that adopted in the majority of federal circuits and
provides a clearer methodology for determining when common issues
are severable from individual issues.

189. Id.
190. Chiang v. Veneman, 385 F.3d 256, 267 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Jenkins v. United Gas Corp.,
400 F.2d 28, 35 (5th Cir. 1968)).
191. Id.; Clark v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., Civ. No. 08-6197 (DRD), 2013 WL 1694451, at *4
(D.N.J. Apr. 18, 2013) (court considered ALI factors and determined that issue of liability was not
separable from individual damages).
192. See, e.g., Wallace v. Powell, No. 3:09–cv–286, 2013 WL 2042369, at *10 (M.D. Pa. May
14, 2013) (court applied ALI factors to determine that certification of liability was wholly separable
from individual issues).
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RULE 23(C)(4) IS AN IMPORTANT TOOL THAT SHOULD BE
USED MORE OFTEN TO OVERCOME CHALLENGES TO
CERTIFICATION IN CONSUMER CASES

The Supreme Court denied certiorari in McReynolds, 193 thereby
leaving the boundaries of Rule 23(c)(4) unsettled. 194 While the use of
Rule 23(c)(4) to bifurcate a class action on the issue of liability and
damages is widely accepted, 195 its use to certify issue classes in “partial
class actions” or “hybrid class actions” is the subject of much debate. 196
In the wake of Dukes, issue class certification is an increasingly
attractive option for litigants in complex consumer cases. Under the right
circumstances, Rule 23(c)(4) can be used to certify an issue class so that
common issues and remaining individual issues are resolved in a manner
that is both fair to the parties and efficient for the judicial system. 197
A.

The Plain Language of Rule 23(c)(4) and Structure of Rule 23
Support an Expansive Interpretation of Issue Classes

The plain language of Rule 23 and accompanying advisory committee
notes support a more expansive interpretation of issue class certification.
Rule 23(c)(4) currently provides as follows: “When appropriate, an
action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to
193. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2012),
cert. denied, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 338 (2012). In the petition for certiorari, Merrill Lynch framed
the issues for review as follows:
(1) Whether the Seventh Circuit’s certification of a disparate impact injunction [in
McReynolds] conflicts with the Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, which
rejected certification of a nationwide class that, like [the class in McReynolds], asserted
disparate impact claims based on employment policies requiring the exercise of managerial
discretion[; and] (2) [w]hether the Seventh Circuit erred in holding, in conflict with other
circuits, that Rule 23(c)(4) permits class certification of a discrete sub-issue when the claim as
a whole does not satisfy Rule 23(b) and hundreds of individual trials would be needed to
determine liability.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. McReynolds,
__U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 338 (2012) (No. 12-113), 2012 WL 3041173, at *i.
194. The Supreme Court’s only decision specifically addressing Rule 23(c)(4) held that a court
has no obligation to utilize Rule 23(c)(4) sua sponte. U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S.
388, 408 (1980).
195. See Romberg, supra note 1, at 263.
196. Id. at 267. See also Timothy Congrove et al., Uncertain Principles? Evaluating the Tension
Between Rule 23(b)(3) And (c)(4) Post-Dukes, and the ALI’s Effort to Integrate the Provisions, 13
CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. 741, 742 (2012). (“Courts have struggled with how the availability of
the Rule 23(c)(4) issue class effects the certification process, especially with respect to the
requirement that common questions predominate over questions affecting only individual
members.”).
197. See Romberg, supra note 1, at 265.
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particular issues.” 198 Originally, issue class certification was authorized
by Rule 23(c)(4)(A), and subclasses were authorized by Rule
23(c)(4)(B). 199 However, in 2007 Rule 23 was amended and the issue
class provision was relabeled Rule 23(c)(4) and subclass provision
became Rule 23(c)(5). 200 The Advisory Committee described the 2007
amendments as “part of a general restyling of the Civil Rules to make
them more easily understood and to make style and terminology
consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be
stylistic only.” 201
Prior to the 2007 amendments to Rule 23, however, a stronger
argument existed that Rule 23(c)(4) could be invoked without first
satisfying predominance. 202 The earlier version of Rule 23(c)(4) read,
“[w]hen appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a
class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be
divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the
provisions of this rule shall then be construed and applied
accordingly.” 203 Both the Second Circuit and Fourth Circuit drew
heavily on this textual analysis in determining that Rule 23(c)(4) could
be invoked without first satisfying predominance. 204
As the court in Gunnells v. Healthplan Services, Inc. 205 articulated,
the Fifth Circuit’s approach is illogical because it renders Rule 23(c)(4)
superfluous. 206 Under the Fifth Circuit’s view, “a court considering the
manageability of a class action—a requirement for predominance under
Rule 23(b)(3)(D)—to pretend that subsection (c)(4)—a provision
specifically included to make a class action more manageable—does not
exist until after the manageability determination [has been] made.” 207
Under this view, a court would only consider Rule 23(c)(4) as a tool “to
198. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4) (emphasis added).
199. Id.
200. Id. 23 advisory committee’s note (2007).
201. Id.
202. See Congrove et al., supra note 196, at 744.
203. FED R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4) (pre-2007 amendments).
204. See In re Nassau Cnty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 2006); see also
Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 439 (4th Cir. 2003) (reasoning that the rule’s
language is an “express command” that “courts have no discretion to ignore”).
205. Gunnells, 348 F.3d 417.
206. See id. at 439 (discussing the dissent’s view that the claim as a whole must satisfy Rule
23(b)(3)’s requirement); see also Nassau Cnty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d at 226–27 (discussing
and adopting the Fourth Circuit’s Reasoning in Gunnells).
207. Gunnells, 348 F.3d at 439 (discussing dissent’s view that claim as a whole must satisfy Rule
23(b)(3) requirements).
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manage cases that the court had already determined would be
manageable without using Rule 23(c)(4).” 208
One commentator argues that the 2007 amendments nullify the
textual analysis relied on by the Second and Fourth Circuits and suggests
that consistent with the reason for the 2007 amendments, “Rule
23(c)(4)’s former structure was similarly nothing more than a matter of
style.” 209 However, the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 included many
substantive changes to the rule, including the creation of 23(b)(3)
classes, 210 thus any inference that the prior structure of Rule 23(c)(4)
was merely stylistic is unsupported.
In fact, a closer look at the 1966 advisory committee notes supports
the interpretation that Rule 23(c)(4) can be invoked prior to showing
predominance. The notes provide, “[i]n a fraud or similar case the action
may retain its ‘class’ character only through the adjudication of liability
to the class; the members of the class may thereafter be required to come
in individually and prove the amounts of their respective claims.” 211
Thus, the Advisory Committee specifically intended for Rule 23(c)(4) to
be used to carve out the common issues for class treatment even if the
claim as a whole would not satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance
requirement.
Finally, commentators note that records of the Advisory Committee’s
proceedings reflect that the committee intended for Rule 23(c)(4) to be
interpreted broadly, evinced by the rejection of language that would
have narrowed the scope of the rule. 212 As originally drafted, the rule
read: “[W]hen appropriate . . . an action may be brought or maintained
as a class action only with respect to particular issues such as the issue of
liability.” 213 The final Rule, however, rejected the narrowing
language. 214 A plausible interpretation of the reason for this change is
208. Id. (emphasis in original).
209. See Congrove et al., supra note 196, at 744 (“[A]ny implication that assessing predominance
comes after the certification of an issue class is wholly absent from the current formulation of Rule
23(c)(4).”).
210. See FED R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (1966).
211. Id. 23(c)(4) advisory committee’s note (1966).
212. Hannah Stott-Bumsted, Severance Packages: Judicial Use of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(c)(4)(A), 91 GEO. L.J. 219, 222 (2002). But see Laura J. Hines, The Unruly Class
Action, __GEO. W. L. REV.__ (forthcoming (2013) (arguing that the private correspondence of
Professor Charles Allen Wright, in which Wright described Rule 23(c)(4) as a “picky detail”
suggests that the Advisory Committee did not intend for Rule 23(c)(4) to play a prominent role).
213. AMENDMENTS: PRELIMINARY DRAFT (Feb.–Mar. 1964), RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE: COMMITTEES ON THE RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES, 1935–1988,
microformed on CIS No. CI-7104-53 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
214. Stott-Bumsted, supra note 212, at 224.
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that the committee envisioned Rule 23(c)(4) to be used beyond situations
of severing liability and damages, in support of a more liberal use of
issue class certification. 215
B.

The Use of Issue Classes Promotes the Goals Rule 23’s Drafters
Intended to Advance

The more expansive interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4) is consistent with
the overall purpose of Rule 23. The class-action mechanism was
designed to conserve “the resources of both the courts and the parties by
permitting an issue potentially affecting every [class member] to be
litigated in an economical fashion.” 216 As the Supreme Court stated in
United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty: 217
[t]he justifications that led to the development of the class action
include the protection of the defendant from inconsistent
obligations, the protection of the interests of absentees, the
provision of a convenient and economical means for disposing
of similar lawsuits, and the facilitation of the spreading of
litigation costs among numerous litigants with similar claims. 218
In Amchem, Justice Ginsburg described Rule 23(b)(3) as “the most
adventuresome innovation” 219 in Rule 23: “framed for situations in
which ‘class-action treatment is not as clearly called for’ as it is in Rule
23(b)(1) and (b)(2) situations, Rule 23(b)(3) permits certification where
class suit ‘may nevertheless be convenient and desirable.’”220 Because it
was drafted the same year as the current Rule 23(b)(3), it is plausible
that Rule 23(c)(4) was drafted to advance the same public policy goals
as Rule 23(b)(3).
C.

The Fact That Individual Determinations of Damages Are
Required Does Not Defeat Commonality

Issue class certification under Rule 23(c)(4) is easily reconciled with
the heightened commonality requirement established in Dukes. Dukes
emphasized that the commonality inquiry should focus on the ability of a
215. See id. at 222–25 for a more in-depth discussion behind the Advisory Committee
proceedings and possible explanations for rejecting the narrower language.
216. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki,
442 U.S. 682, 701 (1979)).
217. 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
218. Id. at 402–03.
219. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 592 (1997).
220. Id. at 615 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note).
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class-wide proceeding to produce common answers to fairly resolve the
litigation. 221 Rule 23 contains no suggestion that the fact that individual
damage determinations are required destroys commonality. Rather,
using Rule 23(c)(4) to identify a particular issue for class treatment at
the outset restructures the case so that common issues are treated
together, and individual issues are treated separately. 222
Rather than viewing issue class certification as an “end-run” around
Rule 23’s requirements, some courts view issue class certification as a
way to “avoid any actual or perceived conflict with Dukes.” 223 By
reframing the certification inquiry to focus only on the issues common to
the class, Dukes’ heightened commonality requirement is more easily
satisfied. For example, in Wallace B. Roderick Revocable Living Trust v.
XTO Energy, Inc., 224 the Tenth Circuit acknowledged the importance of
using Rule 23(c)(4) and (c)(5) to “preserve the class action model in the
face of individualized damages.” 225 Citing Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in
Comcast Corp., the court explained that district courts are “in the best
position to evaluate the practical difficulties which inhere in the class
action format” and are “especially suited to tailor the proceedings
accordingly.” 226 In other words, while the need for individualized money
damages weighs against a finding that common issues predominate,
district courts have wide latitude to sever common issues from
individual issues to preserve the class action model.
The Sixth Circuit recently issued one of the first appellate decisions to
analyze Comcast Corp.’s impact on partial class certification, and
concluded that the liberal application of Rule 23(c)(4) is still viable. 227 In
In re Whirlpool Corporation Front-Loading Washer Products Liability
Litigation (Whirlpool II), 228 the Sixth Circuit affirmed the certification of
221. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011).
222. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, at 585–89. It has been noted that:
Subdivision (c)(4) is particularly helpful in enabling courts to restructure complex cases to
meet the other requirements for maintaining a class action . . . . The theory of Rule 23(c)(4)(A)
is that the advantages and economies of adjudicating issues that are common to the entire class
on a representative basis should be secured even though other issues in the case may have to be
litigated separately by each class member.
Id.
223. In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practice Litig., MDL No. 1840, 2013 WL 1397125, at
*18–19 (D. Kan. Apr. 5, 2013).
224. No. 12-3176, 2013 WL 3389469 (10th Cir. July 9, 2013).
225. Id. at *6.
226. Id.
227. Glazer v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 10-4188, 2013 WL 3746205, at *27 (6th Cir. July 18, 2013).
228. In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig. (Whirlpool I), 678 F.3d 409
(6th Cir. 2012), vacated sub nom. Whirlpool Corp. v. Glazer, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1722 (2013),
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a liability class for consumers who purchased specified Whirlpool
washing machines that contained an alleged defect allowing mold and
mildew to grow in the machines. 229 Proof of damages was reserved for
individual determination following the liability proceeding. 230 The
Supreme Court granted Whirlpool’s petition for certiorari, vacated the
certification order, and remanded the case for consideration in light of
Comcast Corp. 231 On remand, the Sixth Circuit interpreted Amgen and
Comcast Corp. to stand for the principle that “to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3),
named plaintiffs must show, and district courts must find that questions
of law or fact common to members of the class predominate over any
questions that affect only individual members.” 232 The court concluded
that Comcast Corp. broke no new ground for the certification of a
liability only class, and held that class certification was “the superior
method to adjudicate [the] case fairly and efficiently.” 233
Whirlpool II highlights the need for a fact-specific inquiry to
determine whether certification is appropriate, based on the particular
substantive law involved. The court found that it was not improper to
include in the class consumers whose washing machines had yet to
display the defect, because “all Duet owners were injured at the point of
sale upon paying a premium price for the Duets as designed.” 234
Additionally, the plaintiffs did not have to prove that mold manifested in
every machine, because “the injury to all Duet owners occurred when
Whirlpool failed to disclose the Duets’ propensity to develop biofilm
and mold growth.” 235 The court found that these contentions were
common to the entire class and sufficient to warrant class treatment on
the issue of liability. 236 This approach supports the contention that using
Rule 23(c)(4) to carve common issues for class treatment avoids a more
exacting inquiry into the merits of the claim at the certification stage.

remanded sub nom. In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig. (Whirlpool II),
No. 10-4188, 2013 WL 3746205 (6th Cir. July 18, 2013).
229. Id. at *27.
230. Id.
231. Whirlpool Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1722.
232. Whirlpool II, 2013 WL 3746205, at *27.
233. Id. at *28.
234. Id. at *21.
235. Id. at *21–22.
236. Id. at *22.
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Issue Class Certification Allows Litigants to Avoid Uncertainty
Regarding Merits Inquiries, Heightened Commonality, and
Incidental Monetary Relief Post-Dukes

Another compelling argument for endorsing the expansive
interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4) is that by carving out common issues for
class treatment, litigants can avoid difficult and uncertain areas of
certification analysis that have emerged post-Dukes. McReynolds offers
a prime example of how using Rule 23(c)(4) to single out common
issues for class certification allows a large class to overcome Dukes’
heightened commonality analysis.237 By seeking certification only on the
issue of injunctive relief pursuant to a Rule 23(b)(2) class, as the
plaintiffs did in McReynolds, litigants can avoid answering tougher
questions at the certification stage, such as how individual damages
would be calculated. 238 While Rule 23(c)(4) “should not be invoked
merely to postpone difficult certification questions,” 239 using this
provision to reframe the certification analysis by focusing only on the
common issues is a practical and permissible way to reframe complex
consumer cases.
An example of a case that may have come out differently had the
litigants followed the McReynolds approach is Kottaras v. Whole Foods
Market, Inc. 240 In Kottaras, the court denied certification of a class of
plaintiffs who alleged that a merger between Whole Foods Market and
Wild Oats Market violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. 241 Although
the court found that Rule 23(a)(2) was easily satisfied, it ultimately
denied certification because plaintiffs’ evidence was insufficient to
prove that damages could be measured on a class-wide basis, which was
necessary to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance inquiry. 242
The outcome reached in Kottaras was essentially the same as that
reached in Comcast Corp., where the Court determined that certification
was improper for a 23(b)(3) class on the ground that plaintiffs failed to
show that damages could be measured on a class-wide basis. 243 Under
the McReynolds approach, however, the plaintiffs in Comcast Corp.
237. See supra Section III.B.I and accompanying notes (discussing McReynolds).
238. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 491 (7th Cir.
2012), cert. denied, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 338 (2012).
239. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, at 588–89.
240. 281 F.R.D. 16 (D.D.C. 2012).
241. Id. at 18.
242. Id.
243. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1434 (2013).

14 - Smith Comment.docx (Do Not Delete)

2013]

10/10/2013 5:27 PM

REFRAMING CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS

1219

could have used Rule 23(c)(4) to seek certification as a 23(b)(2)
injunctive class, leaving individual damage determinations for a later
inquiry. As one district court expressly noted, “Comcast does not
foreclose a district court from certifying a liability only class under Rule
23(c)(4).” 244 This is not to say that a court will grant certification where
it is clear that litigants are unable to prove that damages are measurable
on a class-wide basis. However, as McReynolds illustrates, seeking
injunctive relief or partial certification on the issue of liability allows
litigants to avoid addressing individual issues at the certification stage. 245
Even after Comcast Corp., a district court allowed partial certification
on the issue of liability, after acknowledging that individual damage
determinations would be required. 246 The court found that Rule 23(a)’s
commonality requirement was satisfied because the case involved a
uniform method of allegedly deceptive practices to sell motor fuel that
affected all class members in the same way, which satisfied Dukes’
common contention requirement. 247 The court found that common issues
predominated, even though individual determinations of damages would
eventually be required.248 The court balanced the efficiencies to be
gained by deciding the issue of liability in a class proceeding with the
burdens of individual trials, ultimately concluding that partial
certification would advance the public goal of achieving a uniform
resolution while also promoting judicial economy. 249
E.

Practitioners Should Proactively Use Rule 23(c)(4) to Frame
Common Issues for Class Treatment

Another unique aspect of Rule 23(c)(4) is the flexibility it provides to
litigants and to the courts. While Rule 23(c)(1) requires courts to
determine whether to certify a class “[a]s soon as practicable after the
commencement of an action,” 250 certification orders “may be
conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the
merits.” 251 Early in the case, the advantages of issue class certification
244. Wallace v. Powell, No. 3:09–cv–286, 2013 WL 2042369, at *19 (M.D. Pa. May 14, 2013).
245. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 490 (7th Cir.
2012), cert. denied, __U.S__, 133 S. Ct. 338 (2012).
246. In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practice Litig., MDL No. 1840, 2013 WL 1397125, at
*18–19 (D. Kan. Apr. 5, 2013).
247. Id. at *18–19.
248. Id. at *19.
249. Id.
250. FED R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1).
251. Id.
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might not be apparent. 252 Fortunately, “[t]he process of isolating the
issues appropriate for representative treatment and dividing the class into
suitable units may be undertaken at any time and the desirability of
doing so should be re-evaluated throughout the litigation.” 253
Despite this flexibility, framing common issues for certification from
the outset is a more advantageous strategy. 254 By carving out only the
common issues for class certification from the outset, litigants prevent
the court from focusing on the weaknesses of the certification request.
This approach was successful in McReynolds, where the plaintiffs made
clear that they requested certification only on the issue of liability under
a Rule 23(b)(2) class. 255 As a result, the court was able to focus solely on
whether the issue class satisfied Rule 23’s requirements. The class also
provided sufficient information as to how the individual issues would be
decided so that the court was satisfied that issue class certification would
advance the efficiency of the litigation.256
Courts have also invoked Rule 23(c)(4) sua sponte to ensure that
earlier certification orders are in compliance with Dukes. 257 In Easterling
v. Connecticut Department of Correction, 258 plaintiffs alleged that the
Connecticut Department of Corrections’ physical fitness test had a
disparate impact on female applicants. 259 The court granted class
certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) in January 2010. 260 After Dukes,
the defendant moved for decertification on the grounds that Dukes
prohibits claims for individualized relief under Rule 23(b)(2). 261 Rather
than grant defendant’s motion, the court instead modified the earlier
certification pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4). Thus, the Rule 23(b)(2) class was
allowed to proceed on the issue of liability and injunctive relief, and a
separate class was certified with regard to individualized monetary
relief. 262 While the court found that there were still several important

252. See Romberg, supra note 1, at 268.
253. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, at 588.
254. See Romberg, supra note 1, at 268.
255. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2012).
256. Id. at 492.
257. See Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 6950(LBS)(JCF), 2012 WL 205875,
at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012), adopted in part by & rev’d in part by, 877 F. Supp. 2d 133
(S.D.N.Y. 2012); Easterling v. Conn. Dep’t of Correction, 278 F.R.D. 41, 45 (D. Conn. 2011).
258. Easterling, 278 F.R.D. 41.
259. Id. at 44.
260. Id. at 43.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 51.
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individual questions to be addressed in the 23(b)(3) damages class, the
court ultimately concluded that these questions were “less substantial”
than the questions that would be “subject to generalized proof” in the
class proceeding. 263
As the next part of this Comment discusses, this approach is not
without drawbacks and is not appropriate in every situation. Certain
types of issues are better suited for issue certification than others, and
determining the limits of issue certification is a largely unsettled and
important area of discussion.
VI. RULE 23(C)(4) IS NOT APPROPRIATE IN EVERY
CIRCUMSTANCE AND REQUIRES A FACT-SPECIFIC
INQUIRY
Rule 23(c)(4) is a discretionary tool, and like other certification
determinations made under Rule 23, a court’s decision to bifurcate
should “be supported by rigorous analysis.” 264 Determining the propriety
of bifurcation under subsection (c)(4) requires a fact-specific inquiry
into the prevalence and type of individual issues present in a given
case. 265 Even courts that have generally approved the use of issue
certification have declined to certify issue classes in certain
circumstances. 266 For example, issue certification is not appropriate
where the predominance of individual issues prevents limited class
certification from increasing the efficiency of the litigation. 267 This is
particularly problematic in cases where issues of individual reliance,
injury, and damages are intertwined with the issue of liability. 268
Additionally, the Seventh Amendment, choice-of-law concerns, and the
specific elements of a cause of action are important factors that must be
considered when deciding whether to certify an issue class.
263. Id. at 50.
264. Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255, 272 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Hohider v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 574 F.3d 169, 200–01 (3d Cir. 2009)).
265. See Farleigh, supra note 52, at 1601 (noting that although recent case law indicates that issue
classes are falling out of favor with the courts, recent appellate decisions declining to certify issue
classes reflect case-specific concerns rather than opposition to the availability of issue class
certification).
266. See, e.g., In re St. Jude Med., Inc., 522 F.3d 836, 841 (8th Cir. 2008) (denying certification
on issue of liability because individual damage trials would still be required to determine causation,
damages, and applicable defenses).
267. See McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 234 (2d Cir. 2008) (denying issue
certification where larger issues such as reliance, injury and damages would remain for each
individual plaintiff, thus certification would not materially advance the litigation).
268. Id.
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Seventh Amendment Re-examination Clause May Preclude the
Availability of Issue Class Certification

One of the biggest challenges imposed by the use of issue classes is
that in some instances, bifurcation of issues may produce constitutional
problems stemming from the Seventh Amendment’s Reexamination
Clause. 269 In cases where the issues receiving class treatment overlap
conceptually with issues to be tried in later proceedings, the Seventh
Amendment prevents issues decided by a jury in the first proceeding
from being reexamined in subsequent proceedings. 270 While this is
certainly an important concern and does preclude issue class certification
in some circumstances, the Reexamination Clause is not implicated in
every type of bifurcated proceeding. For example, where the issue of
liability is wholly distinct from the determination of damages, the jury in
the latter proceeding would not be required to reexamine the findings of
the earlier jury. In many types of product liability and mass tort cases,
however, issues of proximate cause, negligence, and damages are so
closely intertwined that the Reexamination Clause poses an
insurmountable barrier. 271
B.

Choice-of-Law Concerns Arise Where Class Includes Plaintiffs
from Different States

Choice-of-law concerns are another important impediment faced by
class actions in diversity actions involving class representatives from
multiple states. 272 In some cases, multiple state laws could apply to a
single class. If the state laws at issue are uniform, choice-of-law
concerns are inconsequential. However, where the discrepancies in state
laws are material and the class has not agreed on which state’s law

269. The Reexamination Clause provides that “no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.” U.S.
CONST. amend. VII. Although this provision only applies to matters where the Seventh Amendment
requires a jury trial, this category is far reaching and includes most class actions. It includes all
“actions for damages to a person or property, for libel and slander, for recovery of land, and for
conversion of personal property,” Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 533 (1970), as well as “actions
enforcing statutory rights . . . if the statute creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action
for damages in the ordinary courts of law,” Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974).
270. See Farleigh, supra note 52, at 1602; see also In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d
1293, 1303 (7th Cir. 1995) (declining certification where issues of negligence and proximate cause
were so closely intertwined that they would violate the Seventh amendment’s reexamination
clause).
271. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d at 1303.
272. See Farleigh, supra note 52, at 1603.
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should be applied, certification is not appropriate. 273 Recently, a district
court denied certification in a breach of warranty claim where the
plaintiffs failed to set forth which state’s law would govern the class,
and did not establish the elements of a claim for breach of express
warranty in that jurisdiction. 274 Without this information, it was
impossible for the court to determine “if the answers to the proposed
questions would resolve an issue central to the validity of the express
warranty claim.” 275 This decision highlights that Rule 23(c)(4) cannot
salvage claims that do not allege common issues that are capable of
class-wide resolution.
The use of state subclasses under Rule 23(c)(5) is one possible way to
address choice-of-law concerns. 276 As one commentator noted, “[s]tate
subclasses used in conjunction with the issue class might solve this
problem and salvage certification for certain parts of litigation, but
subclassing alone will not always be enough, as plaintiffs may have
factual differences that additionally require subclass lines to be
drawn.” 277 Particularly where the nuances in state law are minor, and the
use of subclasses and issue classes promotes judicial economy, choiceof-law issues do not pose an insurmountable barrier to issue class
certification.
C.

The Type of Substantive Law Involved Factors Heavily into
Whether Issue Class Certification Is Appropriate

Another consideration when determining whether issue class
certification is appropriate is the substantive law involved. While
commentators frequently opine that liability is an issue that is well suited
to issue class certification, 278 the resolution of the issue of liability often
involves multiple stages and elements of law. Although the elements of a
claim differ depending on the relevant cause of action, some elements of
liability are inextricably intertwined with individual issues and may not
be appropriate for class treatment. Elements that involve the defendant’s
conduct specifically are more likely to achieve certification, because

273. See Cochran v. Volvo Grp. N. Am., LLC, No. 1:11-CV-927, 2013 WL 1729103, at *2
(M.D.N.C. Apr. 22, 2013).
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See Farleigh, supra note 52, at 1603.
277. Id.
278. Id.

14 - Smith Comment.docx (Do Not Delete)

10/10/2013 5:27 PM

1224

[Vol. 88:1187

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

these elements are generally common to the entire class. 279 In the
products liability context, courts are hesitant to grant partial certification
on liability because elements of liability may overlap with individual
issues, such as reliance, injury, and damages. 280 While courts have not
explicitly ruled out the possibility of granting issue class certification in
products liability cases, most often, the overlap of individual issues
prevents courts from finding that common issues “predominate.” 281
Consumer and securities fraud are two areas that are generally well
suited for issue class certification. 282 In these cases, the defendant’s
allegedly deceptive practice is generally common to the class and
relatively easy to separate from the remaining individual issues. Pella
Corp. v. Saltzman 283 is a prime example of how Rule 23(c)(4) and Rule
23(c)(5) can be used together to separate common issues for certification
in the consumer fraud context. 284 In Pella, all of the consumers in the
putative class purchased the same defective windows; however, some
consumers had yet to experience any economic harm from the defect at
the time the class sought certification. 285 The Seventh Circuit allowed
for certification of a 23(b)(2) class on the issue of liability, which was an
issue common to all consumers. 286 The plaintiffs also invoked Rule
23(c)(5) to create subclasses to distinguish those plaintiffs who had
already incurred economic harm from those who had yet to incur any
damages 287 and to avoid difficult choice-of law issues that arise for
plaintiffs from different states. 288 Consistent with the approach the
Seventh Circuit has taken when applying Rule 23(c)(4) in previous
cases, the court found that the benefits of judicial economy and
achieving a uniform disposition on the issue of liability outweighed any

279. Id. at 1605.
280. Id. at 1609–10.
281. See McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co, 522 F.3d 215, 222, 234 (2d Cir. 2008) (denying
certification after recognizing that issue class might be appropriate to address whether the
defendants had a scheme to defraud, because issues of reliance, injury, and damages predominated
for each individual plaintiff and partial class treatment would not materially advance the litigation).
282. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, at 235–37 (“[A] fraud perpetrated on numerous persons
by the use of similar misrepresentations may be an appealing situation for a class action, and it may
remain so despite the need, if liability is found, for separate determination of the damages suffered
by individuals within the class.”).
283. 606 F.3d 391 (7th Cir. 2010).
284. See id. at 392.
285. Id. at 393.
286. Id. at 396.
287. Id. at 392.
288. Id. at 396.
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potential concerns surrounding individual issues. 289
CONCLUSION
Categorical rules for issue class certification are difficult to formulate
and would undoubtedly lead to either the overuse, or underuse, of Rule
23(c)(4). The lack of clear judicial guidance on when to use Rule
23(c)(4), however, has led to divergent interpretations of the rule and
significant uncertainty for litigants. This Comment highlights the
importance of achieving a more uniform interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4),
and argues that courts should follow the approach used in the majority of
federal circuits. Furthermore, courts should use the ALI factors to help
guide their analysis to ensure that Rule 23(c)(4) is used appropriately, to
achieve its intended purpose of promoting judicial economy and
improving the manageability of complex litigation.
As this Comment illustrates, the law surrounding consumer class
actions is greatly unsettled. The use of issue classes to “carve at the
joints,” 290 “treat common things in common,” 291 and break up complex
litigation into more manageable pieces is consistent with recent Supreme
Court jurisprudence and faithful to the purposes Rule 23 was designed to
promote.

289. Id.
290. Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 911 (7th Cir. 2003).
291. Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 35 (5th Cir. 1968).

